Abstract-In previous work we have studied the use of sequential second price auctions for sharing a wireless resource, such as bandwidth or power. The resource is assumed to be managed by a spectrum broker (auctioneer), who collects bids and allocates discrete units of the resource. It is well known that a second price auction for a single indivisible good has an efficient dominant strategy equilibrium; this is no longer the case when multiple units of a homogeneous good are sold in repeated iterations. Previous work attempted to bound this inefficiency loss for two users with non-increasing marginal valuations and full information. This work was based on studying a setting in which one agent's valuation for each resource unit is strictly larger than any of the other agent's valuations and assuming a certain property of the price paid by such a dominant user in any sub-game. Using this assumption it was shown that the worst-case efficiency loss was no more than e-1 • However, here we show that this assumption is not satisfied for all non-increasing marginals with this dominance property. In spite of this, we show that it is always true for the worst-case marginals for any number of goods and so the worstcase efficiency loss for any non-increasing marginal valuations is still bounded by e-1 •
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is becoming widely accepted that the current mechanisms for allocating wireless spectrum are not agile enough to efficiently exploit this resource. This has led to interest in a variety of different dynamic spectrum sharing approaches. One such approach is for a spectrum manager or broker to dynamically lease spectrum to secondary users for relatively short time periods. For example, in [1] , [5] , [6] various models with such a spectrum manager are described (see also [2] - [4] for more general discussions of secondary spectrum markets).
One natural approach for allocating spectrum to secondary users is to use an auction mechanism. Numerous auction mechanisms have been studied in the literature. Of these the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is a well known to yield the efficient outcome. 1 However, there are pragmatic reasons to prefer alternative mechanisms over VCG. In [1] one such mechanism was considered for allocating spectrum, namely a sequential second price auction. In this mechanism, This research was supported in part by NSF under grant CNS-0519935. Junjik Bae is with the Boston consulting Group, Seoul Korea, e-mail: baejunjik@gmail.com Eyal Beigman is with the Olin Business School, Washington University in St. Louis (email: beigman@olin.wustl.edu).
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1For a given auction mechanism, the bidders can be viewed as playing a game, in which their actions are their bids. The auction is efficient if the equilibrium of this game maximizes the total utility of the agents.
978-1-4244-4177-8/09/$25.00 ©2009 IEEE the resource is divided into discrete units and each resource unit is auctioned off sequentially according to a secondprice auction. Namely, each unit is allocated to the highest bidder, who pays the second-highest bid. In [1] such auctions were studied for allocating either the power of a particular secondary user or the total bandwidth available to all secondary users. Here, we further consider this mechanism in the context of a bandwidth auction.
Sequential auctions have been used in many applications (e.g., see [7] - [ 10] ) since they require relatively little computation and information exchange among the agents and the broker, compared with other mechanisms. In addition, sequential auctions easily accommodate scenarios in which agents enter and leave the market at arbitrary times, and allow the broker to allocate resources incrementally. However, it is well known that sequential auctions do not always achieve an efficient allocation [9] . In work such as [9] - [17] this efficiency loss has been studied for models in which valuations are private information. Since the assumption of private information so complicates the analysis, these papers restrict attention to the case of bidders with unit demands and in some cases, to just two bidders.
In the present paper we will instead consider a model as in [1] in which bidders may have multi-unit demands but for tractability assume full information. Abstracting away from private information also allows us to focus on the strategic implications of bidding in sequential auctions. 2 For such a model in [1] , it was shown that for two users and an arbitrary number of resource units, the sequential second price auction always has a unique equilibrium 3 allocation. Following [1] , our focus is on characterizing the efficiency loss of this equilibrium for the two users and an arbitrary number of goods, when each agent has a concave utility for the spectrum resource. In [1] it was argued that this efficiency loss was at most~. This argument was based on studying a setting in which one user was dominant, meaning that the user's valuation for each resource unit was greater than the other user's valuation for any unit. It was assumed that in the equilibrium of the sequential auction in which such a dominant user received l units, she would pay for each unit an amount equal to the other agent's marginal valuation for the (n -l +1)-th unit, and moreover, that the equilibrium was given by the allocation that maximized her pay-off subject to this payment property. However, as we will show, neither part of this assumption need be true for every dominant utility profile and so the proof in [1] does not apply to all decreasing marginal valuations. In spite of this, we will show that this property does apply for the worst-case marginal valuations and that indeed the worst-case efficiency loss is at most~.
II. MODEL
We consider a model as in the bandwidth auction studied in [1] . There are n resource units to be allocated among k = 2 agents via a sequential second-price auction. In this auction, the units are allocated sequentially in n rounds. In round m ::; n, each agent submits a bid for the mth unit. The auctioneer allocates this unit to the agent with the largest bid and charges that agent the second largest bid.
This mechanism can be viewed as an extensive form game with a balanced binary game tree. Each decision node in the game tree designates a state of the world, where a certain quantity of goods (resource units) are allocated to the two agents. Let s = (81,82) denote such an allocation.
Since the goods are homogeneous, the decision nodes with the same allocation can be unified and the game tree can be replaced with a directed graph G = (V, E), where Let H desIgnate the set of observable bidding histories. A strategy ai : V x H ---+ lR+ is a function mapping states of the allocation and observable histories to bids. The strategy set of an agent is the set of all such functions. The outcome path of a strategy profile {ai, a2} is a directed path 8 = {s 1 , ... , sn} in G such that if 8~+1 = 8~+ 1 and 8~+1 = 8} for j =1= i then ai(st, f t ) 2: aj(st, f t ), for all j =1= i, where f t is the bidding history of the first t units. 4 The total payment of agent i along the path 8 is Pi (8) 
Here we focus on sophisticated bidding strategies in which an agent maximizes her payoff over final outcomes. The ability to make inferences on the final outcome requires that the agent be sufficiently informed about the preferences and strategies of the other agent. Here, we assume full information, Le., each agent knows the number of units being sold, bidding histories, and the valuations of the other agent. A similar analysis could be made for the case where the agent is Bayesian and knows the distribution of the other agent's marginal values.
III. ANALYSIS
First we review the analysis in [1] regarding the outcome of the preceding auction for two agents with sophisticated bidding and full information. Since all agents know when the last unit is being sold, regardless of the bidding history, the last round of the auction is a standard second-price auction for the n-th good. (The values for this good will, of course, depend on the outcomes of the previous rounds). Hence it is a weakly dominant strategy for the agents to bid their marginal values on the last round. 5 Since those values are common knowledge, all agents know beforehand the allocation and payments in the last round. Thus, we can think of the penultimate round as an auction over the right to participate in one of two auctions in the last round. Since the payoffs of each one of those auctions is common knowledge, we can think of the penultimate round as a second-price auction with valuation equal to payoff difference between those two auctions. It is therefore a weakly dominant strategy in the penultimate round to bid the payoff difference associated with the outcomes of the two auctions in the last round.
We can proceed in this way inductively until we reach the root. This shows that sophisticated bidding is the only strategy that survives iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies. 6 This does not rule out other equilibria and in fact there may exist other Nash equilibria with higher payoffs for both agents (if, for example, they conspire against the seller). However, those equilibria must rely on unreliable threats and commitments. We eliminate those equilibria from consideration by focusing on subgame perfect equilibria that survive the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies. 7 This discussion is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: With two fully informed agents, the sophisticated bidding equilibrium is the only subgame perfect equilibria that survives iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
We define the equilibrium path to be the outcome path when both agents use a sophisticated bidding strategy, and the sequential allocation to be the allocation at the terminal node of the equilibrium path. From the previous discussion if all agents apply a sophisticated bidding strategy, then all equilibria have the same equilibrium path, and the same (unique) sequential allocation.
Example 1: Consider a sequential auction with n = 2 units. Figure 1 (c) shows the directed graph G with each node labeled by the allocation (81,82). Assume that ul = u § = 5, ui = 4 and u~= 1. Since agent 1 values each unit more than agent 2 values any unit, the efficient allocation is to give both units to agent 1. Now let us examine sophisticated bidding for this example. 5 A strategy is weakly dominant for an agent if no other strategy gives that agent a larger pay-off, for any choice of strategies for the other agents. 6In other words all strategies which are weakly dominated are removed from consideration [20] .
7A subgame perfect equilibrium is a refinement of the concept of Nash equilibrium with the restriction that agents cannot make non-credible threats [20] .
8The quantity l/rJ(n) is similar to the "price of anarchy" as in [18] , [19] , except that we are using a stricter equilibria concept here.
(1) 1) Dominant Utility Profiles: An attempt to prove Theorem 2 was given in [1] that was based on studying the family of utility functions defined next. The efficient allocation for a dominant utility profile is to assign all units to agent 1. In the sequential allocation, however, agent 2 may receive up to n -1 units (e.g. this is the case in Example 1).
In [1] , it was (incorrectly) argued that for agents with a dominant utility profile the following properties are always true:
Property D1: In the sequential allocation (s, t) agent pays u;_s+1 for each unit she receives.
Property D2: The sequential allocation (s, t) satisfies Note that with a dominant utility profile, agent 1 will always win at least the last unit and thus in Property D 1, s 2: 1. Property D2 states that in the sequential allocation, agent 1 receives the maximum pay-off she could over all allocations if her pay-offs were subject to satisfying Property Dl. Hence, we refer to an allocation that satisfies (1) as the dominant user optimal allocation.
Referring to Example 1, note that the agents have a dominant utility profile and in the sequential allocation, agent 1's payment satisfies the Property Dl. Moreover, it can easily be seen that this is also the dominant user optimal allocation (Le" it satisfies D2).
In [1] , assuming both of these properties the worst-case efficiency for an auction with n goods and a flat dominant profile was characterized. Furthermore it was argued that the worst-case efficiency over all (non-increasing) valuations for a given number of goods is always achieved by a flat dominant profile. Combining all of these observations, it was argued that 1J(n)~1 -e-1 as the number of goods increases. Furthermore, in [1] flat dominant utility profiles which asymptotically achieve this bound were constructed. These profiles all satisfy both Properties Dl and D2. However, as the next example illustrates, Properties D 1 and D2 need not hold for all flat dominant profiles. Assume that the game reaches node v == (1,0), so that the agents bid for the one remaining unit, given that the first unit has gone to agent 1. (See Fig. 1 (a) In what follows, we characterize the efficiency loss of this equilibrium.
A. Worst-case efficiency loss
Given n resource units and two agents, let ([, n -[) denote the efficient allocation, and ([', n -[') denote the sequential allocation. The worst-case efficiency is defined bỹ~'
{u}},{ur}EU L~=l u; + L~:iu;
That is, the worst-case is with respect to the marginal values in some admissible set U. 8 We refer to I-1J(n) as the worstcase efficiency loss. Our main result given in the following theorem is to characterize this worst-case loss when U is the set of all non-increasing marginal valuations. Theorem 2: In a two-agent sequential second-price auction with non-increasing marginal values 1J(n) 2: 1 -e- 1 . In other words, the worst case efficiency loss is bounded bye-I. Moreover, it can be shown that 1J(n) decreases with n, and the bound 1 -e-1 is asymptotically tight as n~00. Directly generalizing the approach in Example 3 to an arbitrary number of goods is complex due to the increase in the number of constraints that must be accounted for. To simplify this we first further restrict the class of flat dominant utility profiles to a class that supports subgame perfect equilibrium paths along which agent 2 consumes the first n -j units and agent 1 consumes the remaining j units in that order. Later, we show that these profiles give the worst-case efficiency among all flat dominant utility profile.
1 -3E, which for small enough E is larger than her valuation for the first good (2/3 -E). Thus to win, user 1 would have to bid at a larger value than that predicted by Property D 1.
In this example, user 1's payment for the good she receives in the sequential allocation does satisfy Property D 1, however if we instead changed user 2's utility profile to be ui = u~= 1/2 + E and u~= 0, then the sequential allocation becomes (3,1) but user 1 will pay 1/2 + 3E for the first unit she receives, which does not satisfy Property D2.
Because of this example, it follows that the proof in [1] does not apply to all flat dominant utility profiles and so the worst-case efficiency bound given there may also not apply.
2) A Second Try: We denote the worst-case efficiency by 1]' (n) in an auction with n goods when the agents are constrained to having a flat dominant utility profile. As in [1] we will again first bound the efficiency loss assuming that the utility functions are in this class and then argue that this class also gives the worst-case efficiency over all possible valuations.
To begin we first explicitly derive 1]'(n) for n = 2 goods in the following example. From the set of constraints (4) { I> b1 > b2
Definition 2: A node in an equilibrium path is a "kink" if immediately prior to that node (on the equilibrium path) one agent wins and immediately following the other agent wins.
Definition 3: A profile of marginal utilities is said to have the subgame kink property if (1) each path that corresponds to a subgame perfect equilibrium of the entire game has at most one kink, and (2) each path that corresponds to an equilibrium path for a subgame starting at any node not on a path in (1) has zero kinks.
Definition 4: The subgame perfect equilibrium is called a subgame kink when the profile of marginal utilities has the subgame kink property.
Note that if a flat dominant utility has the subgame kink property is must be that in equilibrium agent 2 consumes the first n -j units (for some j < n) and agent 1 consumes the remaining j units. Additionally, the resulting allocation will satisfy Property D 1. The following lemma shows that for any j 2: 1, we can find a flat dominant utility profile with the subgame kink property that results in that allocation.
Lemma 3: For any allocation (j, n-j) in a n-unit auction with j 2: 1, there is a flat dominant utility profile with the subgame kink property for which (j, n -j) is the sequential allocation.
Proof: The following profile of marginal utilities has the subgame kink property with the sequential allocation (j,n -j): ul = ... = u~= 1 for agent 1 and
for agent 2. Note that Ei ---+ 0+ for all i. Backward induction verifies that this results in a subgame kink.
• Note that when Ei ---+ 0 with these marginal utilities, all subgame kinks with the sequential allocations (i, n -i) for i = j, . .. ,n can be supported in equilibrium with the values of the root node [j, 0]. In addition, the following relations among the marginal utilities of agent 2 hold
Essentially this shows that Property D2 holds for these marginals. Proof: This is proved by induction on n. We have already shown that this is true for n = 2. Assume it is true for n -1 and consider the worst-case efficiency of a subgame kink for n units. If the first unit goes to agent 1, we are done since the only subgame kink is then for agent 1 to win everything, which corresponds to the marginal utilities in Lemma 3 for j = n. kink, it must be that 1 -(n -1) .
By combining this inequality with b 2 = 1 -n~l' it can be seen that in the worst-case efficiency it should be that 
Proof:
We prove this by induction on n. From Lemma 4, it is true for n = 2. Suppose it is true for n -1 and consider a n-unit auction with a given constant b. Suppose that agent 2 wins the second unit, then the worstcase efficiency would be
1+n-1 - with a lower efficiency. Furthermore, if this subtree is not a line, it must be that for some m < n, at node (n -m, 0),
However, this can only be true if b 1 > 1 -~, which contradicts the above. Therefore, the subtree from the node (1, 0) is a line with no kinks for the worst-case efficiency.
• From Corollary 7 and Theorem 8, the worst-case efficiency of the sequential auction with the flat dominant utility profile 1]' ( n) is given by (7) , which converges to 1 -e-1 as n -+ 00.
To complete the proof of Theorem 2, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 9: For any number of goods n, the worst-case efficiency is achieved with a flat dominant utility profile. Figure 2. ) Up to this decision node, there is no loss in efficiency. Any efficiency loss in the final allocation procures in the subgame tree rooted at this decision node. Therefore, the efficiency loss of the full game tree cannot be larger than the efficiency loss of this subgame tree. Since the utility profile associated with the subgame tree is dominant, the worst-case efficiency must always correspond to a dominant utility profile. We now show that changing a dominant utility profile to a flat dominant utility profile can only decrease efficiency.
We assume that the sequential allocation is (s, t) with the following flat dominant utility profile: ul = ... = u~2: uI 2: ... u~. Now if we change the marginal utilities of agent 1 to ul 2: ... 2: u~= u~, then the sequential allocation should be (8, f), where 8 2: s. This can be verified easily with the tree of the extensive form game. At every node, agent l's bidding becomes larger with the marginal utilities ut, either agent 1 wins a unit otherwise agent 2 would win or agent 2 has to pay more, which implies 8 2: s. Due to u~> u~and 8 > s, therefore, the efficiency of the sequential 1, -1, -auction can only be lowered by changing the dominant utility profile to a flat dominant utility profile.
• 3) Worst-case utility profiles: Table I shows some examples of the marginal utilities that give the lowest efficiency 1](n ), which is also shown. As can be seen, 1](n) is decreasing with n. As n ---+ 00, these quantities approach the bound from Theorem 2.
We note that these are exactly the same as the constructive examples given in [1] . Also note that in these examples Properties D 1 and D2 hold. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered a sequential second price auction for allocating n units of bandwidth among non-cooperative wireless devices. This mechanism is relatively simple and requires little information exchange among users, which may make it attractive for dynamic bandwidth allocation among secondary users who wish to share spectrum with the primary user (spectrum owner or licensee). Our main result is to characterize the worst-case efficiency of the subgame perfect equilibrium for two users with full knowledge of bidding histories and user utilities. Earlier work attempted to characterize this but did so under an incorrect assumption about the equilibria in auctions in which one user was dominate. Here we show that though this assumption was wrong, the conclusions were correct and that for decreasing marginal utilities, the worst-case efficiency decreases with n and converges to 1 -e-1 .
Although the worst-case efficiency loss due to sophisticated bidding can be significant, simulation results reported in [1] with randomly placed users show that with the rate utility function, the sequential auction typically gives the efficient allocation. Furthermore, when the equilibrium is inefficient, the efficiency loss is typically less than the worstcase efficiency loss. This is due to the rate utility function, which places constraints on the ratios of marginal utilities for the successive units being auctioned.
